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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

)
DANIEL WAYNE ANDERSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

NOS. 47655-2019 & 47656-2019
ADA COUNTY NOS. CR0l-17-19665 &
CR0l-19-38613
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daniel Anderson contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence in Docket Number 47656, and by not reducing his sentence in Docket
Number 47655.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In Docket Number 47655, following a successful period of retained jurisdiction, the
district court suspended Mr. Anderson's sentence (five years, with two years fixed, for stalking)
for a five-year period of probation. (47655 R., pp.59-62; 47655 Conf Docs. pp.694-700 (report
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from the rider program recommending probation).) 1 While he did struggle some early on in that
term of probation, his probation officer implemented intermediate sanctions and indicated
Mr. Anderson handled those issues in an appropriate manner. (See, e.g., Tr., p.9, Ls.4-17.)2
However, Mr. Anderson's mental health issues began to get out of control and, fearing his
probation officer would still decide to revoke his probation based on his earlier struggles,
Mr. Anderson absconded supervision. (Tr., p.9, Ls.17-23.) He was eventually located along
with another person, and that other person's gun was found in Mr. Anderson's backpack. (47656
Conf. Docs., p.49.) Mr. Anderson subsequently agreed to plead guilty to a new charge of felon
in possession of a firearm (Docket Number 47656), and he admitted the corresponding probation
violation in Docket Number 47655. (See 47656 R., p.29-30; 47655 R., pp.133, 138.)
At a joint sentencing/disposition hearing, defense counsel recommended that the district
court impose a sentence of five years, with only one year fixed. 3 (Tr., p. l 0, Ls.24-25.) Defense
counsel explained that, during that one year of required incarceration, Mr. Anderson could get
into prison work programs and to "tune-up" his rehabilitation programming, to get "a bit of a
recalibration to get back on track" before potentially being released back to supervision in the
community. (See Tr., p.10, L.24 - p.11, L.14.) Defense counsel also argued that two years (as
the State was recommending per the plea agreement (47656 R., pp.29-30)) was not needed to

1

As separate records were prepared for each case on appeal, citations to the records will include
the relevant docket number to avoid confusion.
2
Citations to "Tr." in this brief refer only to the transcript of the sentencing/disposition hearing
held on December 16, 2019, which begins on PDF page 12 of the document "Trans.Anderson(19665)," and those citations use the actual transcript page numbers, not the PDF page
numbers.
3
Defense counsel did not specifically address the underlying sentence in Docket Number 47655,
but from his argument, it appears he was implicitly requesting the district court impose a
sentence which would make him parole eligible in Docket Number 47656 at the same time he
finished serving the fixed term on his sentence in Docket Number 47655. (See Tr., p.10, L.16 p.11, L.22.)
2

accomplish those goals. (Tr., p.11, Ls.4-7.) Mr. Anderson added that recognized he had already
been given several opportunities at rehabilitation and apologized for his mistakes, stating that he
felt he had let the district court down. (Tr., p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.7.) He was clear that none of his
explanations for his actions were meant to be attempts to justify those actions.
Ls. I -7.)

(Tr., p.13,

Rather, he accepted responsibility for his failure to comply with the terms of his

probation. (Tr., p.13, Ls.1-7.)
The district court acknowledged that Mr. Anderson's struggles were likely related to
traumatic losses of people in his life. (Tr., p.13, L.18 - p.14, L.2.) It also recognized his efforts
to overcome his initial struggles on probation. (Tr., p.15, Ls.9-13.) In addition, the district court
noted the progress Mr. Anderson had made in his rehabilitative efforts, particularly in terms of
dealing with the anger issues which had resulted in the original charges in Docket Number
47655. (Tr., p.17, L.17 - p.18, L.2.) However, it pointed out that, because Mr. Anderson had
failed to get continuing treatment, particularly for his mental health issues, a return to community
supervision was not feasible at that time. (Tr., p.15, Ls.14-23.)
As such, in Docket Number 47656, the district court imposed a sentence of five years,
with two years, to be served concurrent to the sentence in Docket Number 47655, which it
revoked and imposed without modification.

(Tr., p.16, Ls.20-25.)

The district court

recommended Mr. Anderson participate in the aggression replacement therapy program while
incarcerated, and that he also be assessed to see if he was suffering from depression, which it felt
was potentially present in his case. 4 (Tr., p.16, Ls.17-19, p.17, Ls.3-7.) Mr. Anderson filed

4

The district court did not order, nor did the parties request, a full mental health evaluation of
Mr. Anderson pursuant to LC. § 19-2522. (See generally R., Tr.) However, the district court's
recommendation for an evaluation during the period of incarceration suggests it believed the
most recent GAIN-I evaluation, which had provisionally diagnosed Mr. Anderson, inter alia,
with several depression-related conditions, and not the mental health screening tool, which had
3

notices of appeal timely from the order revoking his probation and the new judgment of
conviction. 5 (47655 R., pp.142, 145; 47656 R., pp.34, 37.)

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in
Docket Number 47656.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by not reducing his sentences in both
cases pursuant to his Rule 35 motion.

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In Docket
Number 47656
Sentencing decisions are committed to the district court's discretion. State v. Reinke, 103
Idaho 771, 771 (Ct. App. 1982). Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See id. at 772. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion in the district court's sentencing decision, he must show that, in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293, 294 (1997); see also Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018) (articulating
the standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion).

concluded Mr. Anderson did not present with a serious mental illness or other mental health
needs at this time. (See 47656 Con£ Docs., pp.74-90.)
5
Mr. Anderson subsequently filed motions for reduction of sentence in both cases which were
(47655 R., pp.149-56; 47656
denied for lack of any new or additional information.
R., pp.41-43.)
4

The govemmg criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:

(1) protection of society;

(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. Id. The Idaho
Supreme Court has indicated that rehabilitation is usually the first means the district court should
consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on
other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord State v. Bickhart, 164

Idaho 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2018) (noting the preference identified in McCoy does not preclude a
sentence of incarceration, if that is ultimately the best method to achieve the goals of
sentencing). In other words, while the district court may place significant weight on one of the
goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of the
other goals as being insignificant or unimportant. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320
(2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently consider various mitigating factors has resulted in
abuses of sentencing discretion in several cases).
A sufficient consideration of the goals of sentencing reveal that the sentence
recommended by defense counsel for both cases - for five years with only one year fixed would better serve all the goals of sentencing in Docket Number 47656. Specifically, such a
sentence would make him parole-eligible at the same time he becomes parole eligible in Docket
Number 47655, and, in so doing, allow him the opportunity to get his mental health issues under
control and to tune-up and recalibrate his rehabilitative programming in a timely manner.
Timely access to rehabilitation is an important consideration at sentencing. See, e.g., State v.
Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008);
cf United States v. Hawkins, 380 F.Supp.2d 143, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that "[t]he
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fact that the defendant engaged in further criminal activity while she was in the process of
rehabilitation does not preclude a fmding of extraordinary rehabilitation" or the imposition of a
more lenient sentence in recognition of that fact).
That particular sentence was more appropriate in Mr. Anderson's case given the fact, as
the district court acknowledged, that probation had been somewhat successful in starting his
rehabilitation process. (Tr., p.15, Ls.9-13 (the district court noting that, when Mr. Anderson had
initially slipped up on probation, his probation officer had employed intermediate sanctions
which seemed to "get things back on track" and "did a lot to get things going better").)
Moreover, as both the district court and defense counsel noted, the major hurdle which
Mr. Anderson faced in his period of probation was the rise of mental health issues, not all of
which may have been fully diagnosed and treated. (Tr., p.9, Ls.17-23, p.13, L.18 - p.14, L.2.)
Understanding and accounting for the role such mental health issues played in a particular case is
an important consideration at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
While the district court did recommend that Mr. Anderson get evaluated for mental health
issues during his time incarcerated, that would not, as defense counsel pointed out, take two
years to resolve. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-7.) As such, the second year of fixed time imposed in Docket
Number 47656 was excessive. Compare Dunnagan, 101 Idaho at 126 (explaining a more lenient
sentence was appropriate because the defendants in that case should be able to take advantage of
the needed rehabilitative programming they needed during fourteen-year sentences, which meant
the twenty-eight-year terms the district court imposed were excessive). That is particularly true
in light of the fact that, as with his early slip ups on probation, Mr. Anderson has already begun
the process of addressing this most recent failure in a pro-social manner, expressing remorse and
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taking responsibility for his new errors. See, e.g., State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App.
2010) (noting that such expressions are the first steps toward rehabilitation).
Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a sentence with two
years fixed in Docket Number 47656, instead of the sentence with one year fixed which defense
counsel recommended.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Reducing His Sentences In Both Cases
Pursuant To His Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to I. C.R 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007). When petitioning for a sentence reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must
show his sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information presented to the
sentencing court. Id. Such requests for reduction of a sentence may be made orally during
revocation proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Beatey, 123 Idaho 273, 275 (Ct. App. 1992 ("There is
no requirement in Rule 35 that a motion made at the time of the revocation of probation be in
writing."). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as
those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125
Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).
Mindful of the requirement for new or additional information in Huffman, Mr. Anderson
maintains the district court abused its discretion by not reducing his sentences in both cases
pursuant to his Rule 35 motions.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that these cases be remanded to the district court for a
new sentencing/disposition hearing.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2020.
/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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